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Abstract 
The Greek crisis has brought to light the strong nexus between the credit risks of European 
banks and their sovereign. We study this phenomenon in Germany, France, Italy and Spain by 
estimating the conditional correlations between sovereign and bank CDS bond spreads over 
the period 2006-2015. Trivariate time-varying regime switching correlation analyses, such as 
the STCC-GARCH and DSTCC-GARCH, are implemented to associate causally the state 
shifts to the dynamics of the so-called “transition variables”. We find evidence of significant 
changes in the correlation structures due to the evolution of both the Greek and Italian crises. 
Keywords: CDS spreads, Greek financial crisis, STCC- and DSTCC-GARCH correlation 
analysis, Contagion 
Jel Classification: E43, E52, F36, C32 
1. Introduction 
We focus on the time varying correlation between the credit default swap (CDS) spreads of 
the bonds of major international banks and of sovereign issuers over the period 2006-2015. 
From here onwards, we use the term nexus to define the link between the default risk of a 
sovereign issuer and the default risk of banks or the reverse. 
Acharya et al. (2015) and De Bruyckere et al. (2013) analyze the feedback loops between 
sovereign risk and bank risk. The direction of causality can run from bank to sovereign risk in 
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countries with sound public finances and weak banking sector or the other way around, i.e. 
from sovereign to banks, when an over-indebted public sector jeopardizes the solvency of 
domestic banks. Gennaioli et al. (2014) investigate the repercussions of a sovereign debt 
crisis on the banking system and on the real economy via the banks’ holdings of sovereign 
debt (assets side).  
Indeed, the unsustainability of public debt affects sovereign creditworthiness and, depending 
on the exposure of banks’ portfolios to government loans, bank’s balance sheets. The overall 
effects, i.e. the strength of the nexus, will depend on the degree of portfolio diversification. 
(Note 1) It is noteworthy that, in response to the Lehman crisis, governments often provided 
explicit guarantees to bank bond issuers in order to restore transactions on the wholesale 
funding market (liabilities side). Recently, Leonello (2018) shows that guarantees link banks 
and sovereign stability even in absence of banks sovereign’s exposure and that under certain 
conditions a larger size of the guarantee can be beneficial to the nexus as it enhances financial 
stability.  
As is well known a sovereign downgrade will increase the cost of funding, which in turn will 
affect credit availability and economic growth, determining spillovers on credit quality and 
thus raising the default probability of banks (Davies and Ng, 2011, Panetta, 2011).  
Both sides can be at work at the same time. Podstawski and Velinov (2018) find heterogenous 
and time varying effects of bank exposure on sovereign credit risk in the Euro area. (Note 2) 
A destabilizing impact - running from bank exposure to sovereign default risk - characterizes 
Spain, Italy and Portugal, especially during phases of financial turmoil, whereas a stabilizing 
effect characterizes the EMU core countries. Gomez-Puig et al. (2018), using three different 
interconnection measures, find evidence of bidirectional linkages between country-level 
banking and sovereign risk indicators for Spain and Italy during the European debt crisis. 
Similarly, Buchholz and Tonzer (2016), study the EU sovereign credit risks interconnections 
and find that the correlation/contagion structure varies across time and countries, requiring 
therefore a dynamic approach.  
Since the inception of the Greek crisis in 2010, several papers have attempted to address the 
issue of contagion from the Greek sovereign bonds to the European sovereign markets and 
national financial systems. This kind of contagion is far from undisputed, however, as the 
mechanism behind is hazy. Mink and De Haan (2016), for example, find that news about 
Greek public finance, per se, do not generate abnormal bank stock returns, with the exception 
of Portuguese, Irish and Spanish banks, while news related to the likelihood of a bail-out 
affect both the European bank abnormal returns and the sovereign bond prices of Portugal, 
Ireland and Spain. Similarly, Buchel (2013), analyzing the impact of communications on 
rescue of indebted countries on PIIGS’ CDS and bond yield spreads, find that statements 
from German, French, EU officials and ECB governing members exert an immediate 
(asymmetric) influence.  
An insignificant economic effect of Greek CDS spread changes on the stock returns of banks 
of other countries is also detected by Beltratti and Stulz (2017), who find that shocks from 
larger countries or multiple peripheral countries, instead, have a substantial impact. 
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According to their analysis the relation between contagion and the holdings of peripheral 
country bonds by banks from other countries is weak. Similarly, Pradigis et al. (2015), using 
a corrected Dynamic Conditional Correlation model, and Philippas and Siriopoulos (2013), 
using a regime switching model and a time varying copula, do not find an overall contagion 
effect from the Greek crisis to other countries. 
Recently, Koutmos (2018) analyzes CDS spreads in the EU to test for contagion and finds not 
only a heterogenous and time-varying pattern of interdependence but also that the role of 
Greece, as catalyst for the shocks cannot be statistically proved. (Note 3) 
About the nature of the Greek contagion, Gomez-Puig and Sosvilla-Rivero (2016) detect both 
pure and fundamentals-based bond yield spread co-movements. Arghyrou and Kontonikas 
(2012), instead, find that evidence of contagion during the European sovereign crisis is 
restricted mostly to the peripheral countries. 
Using a conditional value-at-risk (CoVaR) measure based on copulas and vine copulas, 
Roboredo and Ugolini (2015) investigate the systemic risk implications of a potential Greek 
debt default before and after the onset of the financial turmoil. Sovereign debt was found to 
imply a homogeneous positive systemic risk for domestic financial systems across Europe 
before the crisis. With the onset of the Greek crisis, however, the systemic impact of 
sovereign debt increased for countries like Greece, Italy and Portugal, and remained stable or 
even decreased in other countries.  
R-vine copulas have been used by Zhang et al. (2018) to explore the tail dependence between 
financial stress indicators (including an index of vulnerability of the public and financial 
sector) of 11 European countries. They find that Spain, Italy, Belgium and France are the 
most interconnected.  
Our investigation deals with the strength and the nature of the nexus between domestic 
sovereign and bank bond CDS spreads over the decade 2006-2015. The within country 
analysis is complemented by cross country (contagion) considerations via the transition 
variables. The domestic nexus correlation structure varies, at first, according to the dynamics 
of the Greek-German sovereign bond spread, and later on – in the case of Germany and 
France - also in reaction to the behavior of the Italian-German sovereign bond spread. 
Analyses of the nexus based on standard techniques, which posit a priori causality linkages, 
are likely to be distorted during crises since the direction of causality may vary.  
We implement thus a correlation analysis procedure and - in order to avoid biases due to 
volatility shifts (see Forbes and Rigobon, 2002, among many others) - we use a dynamic 
conditional correlation approach: the smooth transmission constant correlation 
STCC-GARCH of Berben and Jansen (2005) and Silvennoinen and Terӓsvirta (2005) and its 
two transition functions extension, the DSTCC-GARCH by Silvennoinen and Terӓsvirta 
(2009). These techniques - along with a preliminary probit analysis of the factors that bring 
about shifts in DCC-GARCH conditional correlations - allow us to identify two transition 
variables that determine changes in the correlation regime status.  
Our paper contributes to, and improves upon, the extant literature on contagion, defined here 
International Journal of Accounting and Financial Reporting 
ISSN 2162-3082 
2018, Vol. 8, No. 4 
http://ijafr.macrothink.org 4 
as a significant increase in the co-movement of the rates of return of the sovereign and bank 
bonds CDS spreads, in the following ways. First, by focusing on correlation analysis we 
avoid the indeterminacy of ad hoc causality assumptions. Second, the use of a complex 
trivariate STCC-GARCH methodology allows to by-pass most of the shortcomings that affect 
the effectiveness of previous empirical investigations. Indeed, we upgrade the 
heteroskedasticity consistent procedure of Forbes and Rigobon (2002) by avoiding any ad 
hoc assumption on the timing of the crisis and the subsequent sub-sample selection bias. 
Third, we date when correlations among returns increase and, in this way, identify contagion 
events more precisely. Fourth, the transition variables help us to detect which factor brings 
about contagion. We avoid in this way the causal indeterminacy of the extreme events/copula 
contagion analyses. Finally, we assess both the minimal dimension of the shocks required to 
generate a reaction of CDS investors (and thus a shift in the nexus) and the speed of their 
reaction, which reflects the relative heterogeneity of their expectations.  
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents an overview of the empirical 
methodology. In Section 3 we focus on the relation between the Greek financial turmoil and 
the domestic nexuses whereas in Section 4, considering a larger perspective, we include in 
the analysis the concerns about the sustainability of the Italian public debt as a risk 
magnifying factor. Finally, Section 5 concludes the paper. 
2. Trivariate Parameterizations of Time-Varying Correlations via STCC-GARCH (1, 1) 
and DSTCC-GARCH (1, 1)  
In a time-varying context, conditional correlations are usually estimated with the help of the 
DCC-GARCH of Engle (1992). The STCC-GARCH implemented in this paper extends this 
procedure by linking the shifts of the correlations to specific explanatory transition variables. 
Consider a 3x1 vector of CDS daily rates of change, with the following conditional mean 
dynamics 
𝐷𝑠𝑣𝐶𝑡  = 𝑎01 + ∑ 𝑎𝑧1𝐷𝑠𝑣𝐶𝑡−𝑧
𝑙°
𝑧=1   + 𝑢1𝑡
 𝐷𝑏𝑘𝐵1𝑡  = 𝑎02 + ∑ 𝑎𝑧2𝐷𝑏𝑘𝐵1𝑡−𝑧
ℎ°
𝑧=1 + 𝑢2𝑡
𝐷𝑏𝑘𝐵2𝑡 = 𝑎03 + ∑ 𝑎𝑧3
𝑞°
𝑧=1 𝐷𝑏𝑘𝐵2𝑡−𝑧 + 𝑢3𝑡
                   (1) 
𝐷𝑠𝑣𝐶𝑡  is the rate of change of a sovereign bond CDS, where C is a country index, and 
𝐷𝑏𝑘𝐵𝑖𝑡, 𝑖 = 1, 2, is the rate of change of a bank bond CDS, where 𝐵𝑖 denotes a domestic 
bank. 𝑢𝑡 is a 3x1 vector of residuals (𝑢1𝑡 𝑢2𝑡   𝑢3𝑡)′ such that 
𝑢𝑡| 𝛹𝑡−1   ̴̴  𝑖𝑖𝑑(0, 𝐻𝑡)                           (2) 
where 𝛹𝑡−1   is the relevant information set. 
The conditional variance matrix of the residuals has the following time-varying structure 
𝐻𝑡 = 𝐸(𝑢𝑡𝑢𝑡
′ |𝛹𝑡−1)                            (3) 
Bollerslev (1990) posits in the CCC-GARCH parameterization that the conditional variance 
of each residual time series 𝑢𝑖𝑡  , 𝑖 = 1, … , 3, follows a GARCH(1,1) process and that the 
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correlations are constant. The conditional second moments are thus modeled as  
ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑡 =  𝜔𝑖 +  𝛼𝑖𝑢𝑖𝑡−1
2 +  𝛽𝑖ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑡−1,   𝑖 =  1, … , 3                (4) 
ℎ𝑖𝑗𝑡 =  𝜌𝑖𝑗(ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑡 , ℎ𝑗𝑗𝑡  )
0.5, 1 ≤ 𝑖 < 𝑗 ≤ 3                  (5) 
Denoting 𝐷𝑡 as a 3x3 diagonal matrix with diagonal elements given by (ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑡)
0.5 and 𝛤 as 
a constant 3x3 correlation matrix, the conditional covariance matrix 𝐻𝑡 reads as 
𝐻𝑡 = 𝐷𝑡𝛤𝐷𝑡 and can be rewritten in extended form as 
[
ℎ11𝑡 ℎ12𝑡 ℎ13𝑡
ℎ21𝑡 ℎ22𝑡 ℎ23𝑡
ℎ31𝑡 ℎ32𝑡 ℎ33𝑡
] = [
ℎ11𝑡
0.5 0 0
0 ℎ22𝑡
0.5 0
0 0 ℎ33𝑡
0.5
] [
1 𝜌12𝑡 𝜌13𝑡
𝜌21𝑡 1 𝜌23𝑡
𝜌31𝑡 𝜌32𝑡 1
] [
ℎ11𝑡
0.5 0 0
0 ℎ22𝑡
0.5 0
0 0 ℎ33𝑡
0.5
]   (6) 
Berben and Jansen (2005) and Silvennoinen and Terӓsvirta (2005) modify the CCC-GARCH 
model and introduce smoothly time-varying conditional correlations. The latter are assumed 
to switch over time from one (extreme) constant correlation regime to the other according to 
the distance from a threshold value of a transition variable. The shifts in turn depend on the 
dynamics of a continuous logistic function.  
In this case, at time t the 3x3 conditional correlation matrix 𝑃𝑡 can be written as 
𝑃𝑡 = (1 − 𝐺𝑡)𝑃1 + 𝐺𝑡𝑃2 = 𝜌𝑖𝑗𝑡 = (1 − 𝐺𝑡)𝜌𝑖𝑗
1  +𝐺𝑡𝜌𝑖𝑗
2 , 1 ≤ 𝑖 < 𝑗 ≤ 3      (7) 
where 𝑃1 and 𝑃2 are assumed to be constant 3x3 positive definite correlation matrices. The 
logistic function 𝐺𝑡 is defined as 
𝐺𝑡(𝑥𝑡; 𝛾, 𝑐) =
1
1+𝑒𝑥𝑝{−𝛾(𝑥𝑡−𝑑−𝑐)}
, 𝛾 >  0                      (8) 
𝑥𝑡−𝑑 is a transition variable with delay d. The coefficient γ and the threshold c determine, 
respectively, the speed of adjustment and the location of the transition between the two 
regimes. 𝑃𝑡  is, indeed, a mixture of the two correlation matrices 𝑃1  and 𝑃2 . When 
(𝑥𝑡−𝑑 − 𝑐) is large and positive, 𝐺𝑡 is close to 1 and 𝑃𝑡 nears 𝑃2, and when (𝑥𝑡−𝑑 − 𝑐) is 
large and negative, 𝐺𝑡 is close to 0, and 𝑃𝑡 nears 𝑃1.  
In the DSTCC-GARCH(1,1) model the conditional correlations vary according to two 
transition variables. They are parameterized as follows  
𝑃𝑡 = (1 − 𝐺1𝑡)𝑃1𝑡 + 𝐺1𝑡𝑃2𝑡 , 𝑃𝑘𝑡 = (1 − 𝐺2𝑡)𝑃𝑘1 + 𝐺2𝑡𝑃𝑘2, k = 1,2         (9) 
𝜌𝑖𝑗𝑡= (1-G2t)[(1-𝐺1𝑡) 𝜌𝑖𝑗
11 + 𝐺1𝑡  𝜌𝑖𝑗
21] + G2t[(1-G1t) 𝜌𝑖𝑗
12 + G1t 𝜌𝑖𝑗
22], 1 ≤ 𝑖 < 𝑗 ≤ 3    (10) 
with, as transition functions, the logistic functions  
𝐺𝑘𝑡(𝑥𝑘𝑡; 𝛾𝑘 , 𝑐𝑘) =
1
1+𝑒𝑥𝑝{−𝛾𝑘(𝑥𝑘𝑡−𝑑𝑘−𝑐𝑘)}
, 𝛾𝑘  >  0, k = 1,2              (11) 
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For each k (k = 1, 2), 𝑥𝑘𝑡−𝑑𝑘  are transition variables with delay 𝑑𝑘,. The coefficients 𝛾𝑘 
and the thresholds 𝑐𝑘 determine, respectively, the speed of adjustment and the location of 
the transitions between regimes. 𝑃𝑡 is thus a (convex) positive definite mixture of four 3x3 
positive definite symmetric extreme state correlation matrices 𝑃11, 𝑃12, 𝑃21 and 𝑃22, with 
entries 𝜌𝑖𝑗
11, 𝜌𝑖𝑗
,
12,  𝜌𝑖𝑗
21 and 𝜌𝑖𝑗
22 , 1 ≤ 𝑖 < 𝑗 ≤ 3.  
3. The Impact of the Greek Financial Turmoil on Domestic Nexuses  
We use a data set of daily observations on sovereign and banks CDS 5 year spreads (the 
corresponding contract being the most liquid of the CDS market) and on the Greek and 
Italian sovereign spread, i.e. the differential between the yields of the Greek and Italian 10 
year sovereign bonds and of the German 10 year bund. The latter are our selected transition 
variables. 
The panel consists of four large European countries, Germany, France, Italy and Spain, which 
accounted, in recent years, for 75% of the GDP of the EMU. Their net sovereign debt to GDP 
ratios differ significantly and range – in 2015 - from 119% in the case of Italy, to 89% for 
France, 65% for Spain and to 48% in the case of Germany. As we shall see the order of these 
ratios coincides with the ranking of the severity of the estimated impact of the Greek 
financial crisis on the national banks - sovereign nexuses.  
The graphs of Figure 1 are highly informative. CDS premia vary substantially over the 
sample period and reflect the shifts in the probabilities of bond potential defaults that are 
priced by the market. The series in level are not stationary. (Note 4) In France and Germany 
sovereigns are perceived as substantially less risky than banks whereas in Spain and, 
especially in Italy, the CDS levels are alike. (Note 5) The sheer dimension of the financial 
disequilibria hinders, in these countries, any public intervention in favor of distressed banks. 
The co-movements between CDS spreads on sovereign and bank bonds too change over time, 
and justify the stochastic correlation approach adopted hereafter.  
The statistics set out in Table 1 deal with the rates of change of the CDS spreads on sovereign 
bonds and on bonds issued by eight major banks, two each for Germany, France, Italy and 
Spain. They reflect the turbulence of the sample period, since all the time series are strongly 
serially correlated and are affected by nonlinearities.  
Indeed, the BDS test statistics of Brock et al. (1987) strongly reject, with embedding 
dimension 2, the null hypothesis that the rates of return, filtered for first order serial 
dependence, are iid. (Analogous results are obtained for the unfiltered returns, and with 
embedding dimensions varying from 2 to 6.) The standard tests, moreover, suggest that their 
distributions are non-normal (mostly leptokurtic) and conditionally heteroskedastic. An 
analysis of the co-movement of these time series requires, therefore, the use of a multivariate 
GARCH procedure such as the STCC-GARCH(1,1).  
In order to corroborate the selection of the transition variables, we perform a probit analysis 
of first step estimates of DCC-GARCH parameterizations of the conditional correlations of 
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each trivariate system. In every relationship, the dependent variable takes value 1, if the 
magnitude of the conditional correlation at time t is larger than its average value, and 0 
otherwise. The probit specification includes, besides a Lehman dummy, two additional 
dummies obtained from abnormal shifts of the selected transition variables. The empirical 
evidence suggests that they have a clear-cut and highly significant impact. (Note 6) 
 
 
Figure 1. CDS spreads 
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Table 1. Summary statistics 
Variab. Mean 
Std.  
Dev. 
Skew. Kurt. JB 
AR 
(1) 
AR 
(5) 
ARCH 
(1) 
ARCH 
(5) 
BDS 
(2) 
DsvBD 
0.0044 
 
0.1037 
 
10.79 
 
253.54 
 
6473642.0 
[0.00] 
112.97 
[0.00] 
122.92 
[0.00] 
31.24 
[0.00] 
31.36 
[0.00] 
12.82 
[0.00] 
DsvFR 0.0035 0.0847 2.61 39.67 
140432.20 
[0.00] 
166.45 
[0.00] 
174.01 
[0.00] 
80.15 
[0.00] 
363.51 
[0.00] 
19.474 
[0.00] 
DsvIT 0.0020 0.0456 1.30 20.41 
31715.16 
[0.00] 
2.33 
[0.00] 
4.75 
[0.00] 
53.47 
[0.00] 
174.21 
[0.00] 
10.912 
[0.00] 
DsvSP 0.0024 0.0506 0.39 17.08 
20360.29 
[0.00] 
0.92 
[0.00] 
12.93 
[0.00] 
21.93 
[0.00] 
253.94 
[0.00] 
8.371 
[0.00] 
DbkD
BK 
0.0016 0.0466 2.47 37.60 
125102.0 
[0.00] 
123.19 
[0.00] 
126.03 
[0.00] 
243.93 
[0.00] 
358.93 
[0.00] 
14.501 
[0.00] 
DbkIN
G 
0.0019 0.0471 0.65 9.93 
5097.04 
[0.00] 
84.62 
[0.00] 
90.17 
[0.00] 
138.82 
[0.00] 
549.68 
[0.00] 
9.356 
[0.00] 
DbkC
AG 
0.0018 0.0446 0.95 11.74 
8191.50 
[0.00] 
92.46 
[0.00] 
106.03 
[0.00] 
133.83 
[0.00] 
411.47 
[0.00] 
13.114 
[0.00] 
DbkSG
A 
0.0019 0.0451 0.52 9.99 
5122.38 
[0.00] 
136.98 
[0.00] 
159.17 
[0.00] 
241.67 
[0.00] 
669.69 
[0.00] 
13.842 
[0.00] 
DbkM
PS 
0.0020 0.0469 0.98 13.24 
11134.27 
[0.00] 
406.89 
[0.00] 
420.96 
[0.00] 
207.76 
[0.00] 
452.41 
[0.00] 
15.616 
[0.00] 
DbkIS
P 
0.0018 0.0525 1.40 20.05 
30564.91 
[0.00] 
53.06 
[0.00] 
61.34 
[0.00] 
91.59 
[0.00] 
267.48 
[0.00] 
15.385 
[0.00] 
DbkC
AIXA 
0.0010 0.0489 0.82 11.63 
5728.03 
[0.00] 
29.19 
[0.00] 
34.72 
[0.00] 
140.61 
[0.00] 
157.03 
[0.00] 
8.750 
[0.00] 
DbkBB
VA 
0.0011 0.0445 0.23 8.47 
2234.47 
[0.00] 
73.046 
[0.00] 
113.45 
[0.00] 
120.48 
[0.00] 
653.81 
[0.00] 
14.579 
[0.00] 
VIX 0.0596 7.2255 1.27 9.35 4791.80 
[0.00] 
8.43 
[0.00] 
13.56 
[0.00] 
34.99 
[0.00] 
122.61 
[0.00] 
7.833 
[0.00] 
GGsp 0.0118 0.2930 0.54 26.72 
57734.69 
[0.00] 
66.58 
[0.00] 
91.54 
[0.00] 
171.48 
[0.00] 
601.38 
[0.00] 
14.602 
[0.00] 
∆𝐺𝐺𝑠𝑝
+  0.0754 0.2051 6.04 54.82 
322766.51 
[0.00] 
71.45 
[0.00] 
120.27 
[0.00] 
46.12 
[0.00] 
135.58 
[0.00] 
5.276 
[0.00] 
∆𝐼𝐺𝑠𝑝
+  0.0229 0.0522 4.51 29.32 
96333.13 
[0.00] 
3.69 
[0.05] 
12.61 
[0.03] 
135.58 
[0.00] 
3.09 
[0.69] 
1.485 
[0.14] 
Notes: DsvC = daily rate of change of the CDS premium on sovereign bonds issued by 
country C, C = BD, FR, IT and SP; DbkB = daily rate of change of the CDS premium on 
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bonds issued by bank B, B = DBK, ING, SGA, CAG, MPS, ISP, CAIXA and BBVA; 
∆𝑉𝐼𝑋𝑡 = daily change of the VIX; GGsp: daily change in the spread between the yields of 
Greek and German 10 years bonds; ∆𝐺𝐺𝑠𝑝
+ : positive daily change in the spread between the 
yields of Greek and German 10 years bonds; ∆𝐼𝐺𝑠𝑝
+ : positive daily change in the spread 
between the yields of Italian and German 10 years bonds; Probability values in square 
brackets; Skew: Skewness; Kurt: Excess Kurtosis; JB: Jarque-Bera normality test; AR(n): 
Ljung-Box test statistic for n-th order serial correlation of the time series; ARCH(n): 
Ljung-Box test statistic for n-th order serial correlation of the squared time series; BDS(k): 
z-test statistic, with embedding dimension k and Є value =.9, of the null that the time series, 
filtered for a first order autoregressive structure, is independently and identically distributed. 
Table 2. System 1 
𝑃𝑡 = (1 − 𝐺𝑡)𝑃1 + 𝐺𝑡𝑃2 = 𝜌𝑖𝑗𝑡 = (1 − 𝐺𝑡)𝜌𝑖𝑗
1  +𝐺𝑡𝜌𝑖𝑗
2 , 1 ≤ 𝑖 < 𝑗 ≤ 3            (12) 
𝐺𝑡(𝑥𝑡; 𝛾, 𝑐) =
1
1+𝑒𝑥𝑝{−𝛾(𝑥𝑡−𝑑−𝑐)}
, 𝛾 >  0                    (13) 
 GERMANY FRANCE ITALY SPAIN 
Transition 
Variable 
𝛥𝐺𝐺𝑠𝑝𝑡−3 𝛥𝐺𝐺𝑠𝑝𝑡−6 𝛥𝐺𝐺𝑠𝑝𝑡−7 𝛥𝐺𝐺𝑠𝑝𝑡−4 
Usable data 2006:01:10 - 2015:06:03 2006:01:10 - 2015:06:03 2006:01:10 - 2015:06:03 2008:08:11 - 2015:06:03 
 SOV. DBK ING SOV. CAG SGA SOV. ISP MPS SOV. CAIXA BBVA 
𝜌12
1  0.3911 
( 36.0656) 
0.3014 
(25.6189) 
0.4398 
(15.7684) 
0.5478 
(14.6712) 
𝜌13
1  0.41482 
(37.9990) 
0.3139 
(26.7486) 
0.41894 
(16.8921) 
0.1677 
(2.2909) 
𝜌32
1  0.7230 
(125.0255) 
0.7144 
(118.2438) 
0.8025 
(93.3619) 
0.3284 
(5.0037) 
𝜌12
2  0.6866 
(30.8745) 
0.6420 
(22.8153) 
0.7053 
(27.0543) 
0.7350 
(7.3253) 
𝜌13
2  0.7334 0.6349 0.7102 0.8332 
International Journal of Accounting and Financial Reporting 
ISSN 2162-3082 
2018, Vol. 8, No. 4 
http://ijafr.macrothink.org 10 
(38.4523) (26.0420) (33.3659) (6.8294) 
𝜌32
2  0.8215 
(66.1891) 
0.7463 
(41.4232) 
0.9076 
(97.3057) 
0.9040 
(23.0761) 
ϒ 30.4523 
(3.1898) 
21.9397 
(3.7756) 
92.6383 
(4.2748) 
2.2127 
(4.5038) 
C 0.1523 
(12.8655) 
0.1918 
(11.4399) 
0.0531 
(4.2246) 
0.5989 
(3.1471) 
LLF 15078.8882 14327.5278 15237.4094 10067.8219 
 𝜀1𝑡 𝜀2𝑡 𝜀3𝑡 𝜀1𝑡 𝜀2𝑡 𝜀3𝑡 𝜀1𝑡 𝜀2𝑡 𝜀3𝑡 𝜀1𝑡 𝜀2𝑡 𝜀3𝑡 
E(𝜀𝑙𝑡)*  0.017 0.029 0.032 0.032 0.041 0.019 0.021 0.026 0.023 0.014 0.006 -0.021 
E(𝜀𝑙𝑡
2 ) 1.000 0.996 0.996 1.004 0.994 0.998 0.999 0.996 0.998 1.005 1.010 1.012 
ARCH(1) 0.000 
[0.988] 
0.774 
[0.379] 
0.373 
[0.541] 
1.809 
[0.179] 
0.057 
[0.811] 
1.081 
[0.298] 
0.182 
[0.670] 
0.113 
[0.737] 
1.088 
[0.297] 
0.253 
[0.615] 
1.586 
[0.208] 
0.031 
[0.859] 
ARCH(2) 0.156 
[0.925] 
0.781 
[0.677] 
0.582 
[0.747] 
2.334 
[0.311] 
0.078 
[0.962] 
1.125 
[0.570] 
0.294 
[0.863] 
0.265 
[0.876] 
1.089 
[0.580] 
1.572 
[0.456] 
1.898 
[0.387] 
0.457 
[0.796] 
ARCH(5) 0.894 
[0.971] 
4.962 
[0.421] 
9.832 
[0.080] 
4.363 
[0.498] 
7.788 
[0.168] 
5.407 
[0.368] 
1.382 
[0.926] 
2.922 
[0.712] 
6.974 
[0.223] 
4.033 
[0.545] 
4.153 
[0.528] 
1.234 
[0.942] 
JB 1999.3 
[0.000] 
863.0 
[0.000] 
1559.4 
[0.000] 
10409.2 
[0.000] 
1385.7 
[0.000] 
392.7 
[0.000] 
3824.5 
[0.000] 
1194.4 
[0.000] 
592.5 
[0.000] 
418.7 
[0.000] 
215.5 
[0.000] 
3830.6 
[0.000] 
BDS(2) 0.587 
[0.557] 
1.262 
[0.207] 
1.039 
[0.299] 
4.225 
[0.000] 
0.799 
[0.424] 
1.353 
[0.176] 
1.796 
[0.072] 
0.827 
[0.408] 
-0.585 
[0.559] 
-0.368 
[0.712] 
-0.711 
[0.477] 
-0.095 
[0.924] 
BDS(3) 0.985 
[0.325] 
0.754 
[0.451] 
1.285 
[0.199] 
4.138 
[0.000] 
0.852 
[0.394] 
1.235 
[0.217] 
2.351 
[0.019] 
0.263 
[0.793] 
-0.567 
[0.570] 
-0.908 
[0.364] 
-0.807[ 
0.419] 
-0.426 
[0.670] 
Notes. *: 𝜀𝑖𝑡 = 𝑢𝑖𝑡 ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑡
0.5, 𝑖 = 1, 2, 3⁄ ; Prob. values in square brackets; JB: Jarque-Bera normality 
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test; ARCH(n): Ljung-Box test statistic for n-th order serial correlation of the squared time 
series; BDS(k): z-test statistic, with embedding dimension k and and Є value =.9, of the null 
that the standardized residuals are independently and identically distributed. 
Table 2 presents the conditional correlations and the smooth transition parameters of 
equations (7) and (8), where the transition variable is the Greek-German sovereign 10 year 
bond spread first difference. Strongly significant from a statistical point of view, they have 
the appropriate size and the expected sign. (Note 7) The usual misspecification tests 
performed using the standardized residuals, suggest that the quality of fit is adequate (E(𝜀𝑙𝑡) = 
0, E(𝜀𝑙𝑡
2 ) = 1 and 𝜀𝑙𝑡 conditionally homoskedastic and serially uncorrelated, for 𝑙 =  1, … , 3).  
Indeed, the BDS(2) and BDS(3) test statistics, resulting from BDS tests with embedding 
dimensions 2 and 3, fail to reject (with one exception only) the null that the standardized 
residuals are iid. The nonlinearities detected in the return time series of Table 1 are filtered 
away by the model. However, since the Jarque-Bera statistics systematically reject the null of 
normality, we compute the estimates using the robust QMLE procedure developed by 
Bollerslev and Wooldridge (1992).  
Table 3. Average dimension and persistence of the conditional correlations over the two 
regimes 
 Number 
of days in 
regime 1 
(no 
contagion) 
Average 
value of the 
cond. 
correlations 
between 
sovereign 
and domestic 
banks bonds 
CDS spreads 
rates of 
change in 
regime 1 
(no 
contagion) 
Number of 
days in 
regime 2 
(contagion) 
Average value 
of the cond. 
correlations 
between 
sovereign and 
domestic 
banks bonds 
CDS spreads 
rates of 
change in 
regime 2 
(contagion) 
Increase in 
regime 2 
cond. 
correlations 
vs. regime 1 
cond. 
correlations. 
(pct.) 
Number 
of days in  
regime 1/ 
number of 
days in 
regime 2  
Full Sample 2006:01:10 - 2015:06:03 
Germany 2125 0.4127 333 0.6802 64.7983 6.3813 
France 2189 0.3197 269 0.6060 89.5981 8.1375 
Italy 1836 0.4362 622 0.6956 59.5675 2.9518 
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Spain 1710 0.4065 69 0.6436 93.6009 24.7826 
Pre-Greek crisis period 2006:01:10 - 2010:01:04 
Germany 1030  0.4082 16 0.64785 58.6679 64.3751 
France 1037 0.3149 9 0.5484 74.1971 115.2222 
Italy 975 0.4351 71 0.6823 56.8788 13.7324 
Spain 367 0.4485 0              
Greek crisis period 2010:01:05 - 2015:06:03 
Germany 1095       0.4170 317 0.6811 63.2989 3.4542 
France 1152 0.3370 260 0.6066 80.5878 4.4307 
Italy 861 0.4850 551  0.6957 44.2452 1.5626 
Spain 1343 0.4495 69  0.6436 55.9896 19.4637 
Note: For each country, the sovereign-bank bonds CDS correlations are simple averages of 
the correlations between the rates of change of the spreads of sovereign bonds CDS and the 
rates of change of the spreads of the CDS of the bonds issued by the corresponding national 
banks. 
To extract additional useful insights, in Table 3 we label as “contagious” the regime in which 
the transition function is larger than 0.5 and the conditional correlation - the nexus - is closer 
to its high extreme value 𝑃2 (regime 2) than to its low extreme value 𝑃 1(regime 1). The 
relative number of days spent in each regime and the relative dimension of the corresponding 
conditional correlations differ among countries.  
In Germany and France, the number of days in the “no contagion” regime is from 6 to 7 times 
larger than the number of days in the “contagion” regime. In the latter, the size of the nexus 
rises by 65 percent in Germany and by 90 percent in France. In the peripheral countries of the 
sample, the results are less homogeneous.  
The number of days in the “no contagion” regime is only 3 times larger than the number of 
days in the “contagion” one in Italy and 24 times larger in Spain. In the same way, the nexus 
in Italy increases by 60 percent in the “contagion” regime, in line with the increases in the 
core countries of the sample. This is not the case in Spain, where the rise in the nexus is huge 
(larger than 90 percent). It is noteworthy that the estimates repeated over the Greek-crisis 
subsample are qualitatively similar to the full sample ones, as the contagion phenomena turn 
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out to occur mostly during the Greek financial turmoil.  
Additional information is provided by the graphs of Figure 2, where the nexuses are related to 
changes in the differences between Greek and German bond yields (the values of the selected 
transition variable). The shape of the curves depends upon the values of the coefficient 
gamma (speed of adjustment variable) and c (threshold parameter) estimates in Table 2. (Note 
8) In Germany and France we detect a similar market psychology, since the dynamics of the 
nexuses (i.e. the conditional correlations between banks and sovereign bond CDS) displays a 
strong similarity. 
This is not the case for Spain and Italy. Agents’ reactions are strong and homogenous in Italy 
whereas they are slow and highly heterogeneous in Spain. In Italy, the nexuses fluctuate 
frequently and abruptly from one regime to the other, while in Spain they change more 
slowly and tend to be persistent.  
In Italy traders have a common risk perception and react to small variations of the Greek 
German yield spread, in Spain an opposite behavior holds; the dimension of the public (rather 
than of banks’) debt seems to be the discriminating factor in the risk assessment of bond 
traders.  
The larger the stock of sovereign debt the faster and more homogeneous is the positive shift 
in the pricing of risk and the smaller the absolute value of the Greek-German sovereign risk 
differential that triggers it. The differing patterns of reaction, detected in Figure 2, reveal that 
the focus of the markets is on sovereign financial equilibrium, in line with the major policy 
recommendations of the European institutions. 
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Figure 2. Speed/homogeneity of the reaction of the nexus to shifts of the Greek-German yield 
differential 
4. The Role of the Italian Public Debt 
On the basis of the above considerations and taking into account the relevance of the 
systemic risk channel pointed out by Beltratti and Stultz (2017), who notice that holdings of 
peripheral country bonds by core banks may not be a statistically and economically 
significant contagion channel, we extend our analysis introducing a second transition 
variable, the positive changes of the BTP Bund sovereign bond spread. (Note 9) To give 
substance to the Italian channel hypothesis, we compute - using data from the BIS quarterly 
review - the share of the outstanding claims on Greek and Italian official sectors by German 
and French banks with respect to their total claims on the foreign official sector.  
The findings, set out in Table 4, support the view that, after 2011, Greece should not be 
International Journal of Accounting and Financial Reporting 
ISSN 2162-3082 
2018, Vol. 8, No. 4 
http://ijafr.macrothink.org 15 
viewed as the unique source of contagion. The share of the Italian official sector claims 
reported by French and German banks seems to have magnified the effect of the Greek 
turmoil; the sheer size of the Italian public debt being able to transform tensions in the Italian 
sovereign sector into a threat to the survival of the euro area. 
Table 4. Claims of German and French banks on the Greek and Italian official sectors as 
percentage of their respective claims on the overall foreign official sector 
GREECE 
 
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Germany 5.32 2.60 0.02 0.06 0.07 0.01 
France 4.53 1.77 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.00 
ITALY 
 
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Germany 18.18 16.11 14.73 15.58 14.95 12.88 
France 29.96 17.98 27.21 31.33 22.64 22.99 
Note: Raw data are obtained from the BIS quarterly report statistics. 
In order to account for the role of an additional highly indebted peripheral country, such as 
Italy, the STCC-GARCH(1,1) model has been extended by adding a second transition 
variable, the daily positive changes in the difference between the yields of the Italian 10 year 
BTP and of the German 10 year Bund. The DSTCC-GARCH(1,1) model parameterized by 
equations (9), (10) and (11) of Section 2 is therefore estimated, where 𝑥1𝑡 and 𝑥2𝑡 are, 
respectively, the positive changes in the differentials between the Greek-German and 
Italian-German 10 year sovereign bonds yields, ∆𝐺𝐺𝑡
+ and ∆𝐼𝐺𝑡
+.  
The conditional correlations and the smooth transition parameters are set out in Table 5. The 
estimates are significant from a statistical point of view and have the appropriate size and the 
expected sign. (Note 10) The usual misspecification tests, performed using the standardized 
residuals, suggest that the quality of fit is adequate and the BDS(2) and BDS(3) tests fail to 
reject (with one exception only) the null that the standardized residuals are iid. The 
nonlinearities of the return time series of Table 1 are filtered away by the 
DSTCC-GARCH(1,1) model. The estimates are performed using the robust QMLE procedure 
developed by Bollerslev and Wooldridge (1992), since the Jarque-Bera statistics 
systematically reject the null of normality. 
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Table 5. System 2 
𝑃𝑡 = (1 − 𝐺1𝑡)𝑃1𝑡 +  𝐺1𝑡𝑃2𝑡  , 𝑃𝑘𝑡 = (1 − 𝐺2𝑡)𝑃𝑘1 +  𝐺2𝑡𝑃𝑘2 k = 1,2        (14) 
𝐺𝑡(𝑥𝑘𝑡; 𝛾𝑘, 𝑐𝑘) =
1
1+𝑒𝑥𝑝{−𝛾𝑘(𝑥𝑘𝑡−𝑑−𝑐𝑘)}
, 𝑦𝑘  >  0 
𝜌𝑖𝑗𝑡= (1 -  G2t) [(1 - 𝐺1𝑡) 𝜌𝑖𝑗
11 + 𝐺1𝑡 𝜌𝑖𝑗
21] + G2t [(1 - G1t) 𝜌𝑖𝑗
12 +  G1t 𝜌𝑖𝑗
22] , 1 ≤ 𝑖 < 𝑗 ≤ 3 (15)  
 GERMANY    FRANCE  
Transition 
Variables 
∆𝐺𝐺𝑠𝑝
+
𝑡−3
 
∆𝐼𝐺𝑠𝑝
+
𝑡−3
 
∆𝐺𝐺𝑠𝑝
+
𝑡−5
 
𝛥∆𝐼𝐺𝑠𝑝
+
𝑡−5
 
Usable data 2006:01:10 - 2015:06:03 2006:01:10 - 2015:06:03 
 SOV. DBK ING SOV.CAG SGA 
𝜌12
11 0.3202 
(23.3204) 
0.0716 
(2.9856) 
𝜌13
11 0.3233 
(22.0359) 
0.0838 
(3.5583) 
𝜌32
11 0.6978 
(93.3591) 
0.6821 
(49.0902) 
𝜌12
12 0.5566 
(21.4249) 
1.0344 
(16.8893) 
𝜌13
12 0.6416 
(40.0859) 
0.7734 
(9.0947) 
𝜌32
12 0.7803 
(74.0478) 
0.8132 
(12.5108) 
𝜌12
21 0.6988 
(0.0475) 
0.4844 
(26.6381) 
𝜌13
21 0.7795 0.5056 
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(17.2453) (25.4176) 
𝜌32
21 0.8399 
(33.5343) 
0.7464 
(84.0399) 
𝜌12
22 0.7501 
(21.4721) 
0.6968 
(18.2619) 
𝜌13
22 0.7691 
(29.5915) 
0.7391 
(21.8697) 
𝜌32
22 0.8167 
(39.9912) 
0.7062 
(25.4551) 
𝛾1 10.8468 
(7.6162) 
25.5783 
(4.4065) 
𝑐1 0.2153 
(10.3284) 
0.01218 
(2.8935) 
𝛾2 233.6876 
(1.9886) 
38.8457 
(4.5767) 
𝑐2 0.0227 
(7.6424) 
0.1103 
(12.7656) 
LLF 15102.597 14342.492 
 𝜀1𝑡 𝜀2𝑡 𝜀3𝑡 𝜀1𝑡 𝜀2𝑡 𝜀3𝑡 
E(𝜀𝑙𝑡)*  0.018 0.024 0.026 0.047 0.061 0.047 
E(𝜀𝑙𝑡
2 ) 0.993 1.005 0.999 1.013 0.988 0.996 
ARCH(1) 0.005 
[0.942] 
0.791   
[0.374] 
0.282  
[0.595] 
1.671   
[0.196] 
0.077   
[0.782] 
1.138   
[0.286] 
ARCH(2) 0.108 0.802   0.428   2.168   0.110   1.183   
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[0.947] [0.669] [0.807] [0.338] [0.947] [0.553] 
ARCH(5) 0.908 
[0.969] 
4.898   
[0.428] 
8.538   
[0.128] 
4.185   
[0.523] 
8.132 
[0.149] 
5.386  
[0.371] 
JB 2072.12 
[0.000] 
1042.08 
[0.000] 
1137.71 
[0.000] 
11667.8 
[0.000] 
1516.66 
[0.000] 
360.25 
[0.000] 
BDS(2) 0.483 
[0.629] 
1.265 
[0.206] 
0.933 
[0.351] 
4.049 
[0.000] 
0.854 
[0.393] 
1.384  
[0.166] 
BDS(3) 0.835 
[0.404] 
0.738 
[0.460] 
1.153 
[0.249] 
4.068 
[0.000] 
0.921 
[0.357] 
1.273  
[0.203] 
Notes. *: 𝜀𝑖𝑡 = 𝑢𝑖𝑡 ℎ𝑖𝑖𝑡
0.5, 𝑖 = 1, 2, 3⁄ ;  Probability values in square brackets; JB: Jarque-Bera 
normality test; ARCH(n): Ljung-Box test statistic for n-th order serial correlation of the 
squared time series; BDS(k): z-test statistic, with embedding dimension k and and Є value 
=.9, of the null that the standardized residuals are independently and identically distributed. 
The interaction of regimes 1 and 2 for the Greek-German and Italian-German transition 
variables produces the correlation tree sketched below.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The positive shifts of the Greek-German yield differential determine two regimes according 
to the positive changes of the sovereign spread being below or above a threshold value c1, 
each of which, in turn, can be associated with two regimes generated by positive shifts of the 
Italian-German yield differentials. We obtain in this way the four regime paths above, where 
the transitions from one regime to the other are modeled by smooth transmission 
mechanisms.  
A perusal of the estimates of Table 5 shows that when both transition variables are in regime 
1, the nexuses (𝜌12
11, 𝜌13
11) are quite small. They increase substantially when the transition 
∆𝐺𝐺𝑡−𝑑
+ <c1 
[Regime 1] 
∆𝐺𝐺𝑡−𝑑
+ >c1 
[Regime 2] 
∆𝐼𝐺𝑡−𝑑
+ <c2 [Regime1] 
𝜌11 
∆𝐼𝐺𝑡−𝑑
+ >c2 [Regime 2] 
𝜌12 
∆𝐼𝐺𝑡−𝑑
+ >c2 [Regime 2]  
𝜌22 
∆𝐼𝐺𝑡−𝑑
+ <c2 [Regime 1]  
𝜌21 
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variable associated with the Italian debt is in regime 2 (𝜌12
12, 𝜌13
12). The correlations of Table 2 
(𝜌12
1 , 𝜌13
1 ), for Germany and France, thus, are likely to be the by-product of a combination of 
shocks, which have to be disentangled. We find an analogous result when the Greek-German 
bonds yield differential is in regime 2. On average, the association with a contagion regime in 
Italy determines a significant increase in the nexuses (𝜌12
22, 𝜌13
22) both in Germany and France 
with respect to 𝜌12
21 and 𝜌13
21. Here too, the size of the single transition variable correlations 
estimates of Table 2 (𝜌12
2 , 𝜌13
2 ) seems to be due to multiple causes.  
The seventy days centered moving averages of the conditional correlations obtained from 
historical simulations of the estimates of the STCC and DSTCC -GARCH models of Tables 2 
and 5, set out in Figure 3, support the hypothesis of an amplifying effect of the Italian 
financial stress. In each graph, the blue line – associated with the DSTCC-GARCH model - 
lies above the black STCC-GARCH line whenever the Italian-German yield differential is 
large and below it whenever this differential is small even if the absolute value of the shifts of 
the latter are much smaller than those of the correspond Greek-German bond yield 
differential. (Note 11) 
As for the estimated speed of convergence, 𝛾1 is always lower than 𝛾2, which suggests that 
the Italian default risk is likely to trigger a much faster reaction of market agents. As for the 
threshold values c, they are not comparable since in Table 5 they refer only to positive 
changes of the Greek and Italian sovereign bond yields spread whereas in Table 2 both 
positive and negative changes are considered.  
Germany 
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Figure 3. 70 days MA of the STCC and DSTCC GARCH conditional correlations 
The results suggest that the two transition variables matter in both core countries, since 
concomitant positive changes of sovereign bond spreads determine a significant rise in the 
conditional correlations. In France, however, the behavior of the estimated correlation 
coefficient through regimes suggests that the role of the Italian debt be dominant, a result in 
line with the size of the outstanding claims of French banks towards Italian official 
counterparties (see Table 4). 
5. Conclusions 
The interconnections between sovereign and banks CDS spreads are highly informative and 
provide new insights on the financial contagion triggered by the Greek crises. Using the 
STCC-GARCH methodology we find similar patterns of behavior in core countries 
(Germany and France) and strong dissimilarities in the so called peripheral ones (Italy and 
Spain). In the peripheral countries, the main driver of contagion is the perceived default risk 
of the sovereign issuer, which is linked to the size of the outstanding public debt for a well 
know debt sustainability issue. Actually, the Italian banks are hit by the Greek turmoil more 
severely than the Spanish ones.  
We extend, therefore, the model introducing a second transition variable related to the Italian 
public debt. We find that core countries nexuses are affected and increase in a significant way 
whenever the Italian-German 10 year bond spread change rises above a regime threshold. 
This highlights the key role of the Italian sovereign debt on the tenability of the EMU project. 
However, it is the concomitant occurrence of tensions on the Italian and Greek sovereign 
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bond markets that matters. Indeed, positive changes of the Italian spread exert a magnifying 
effect on the nexuses of core countries, especially in the case of France.  
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Notes 
Note 1. It should be noticed that current regulation, which provides for a preferential 
treatment to euro sovereign securities, has probably reinforced this correlation. 
Note 2. They use a Markov switching structural vector autoregressive in a heteroscedastic 
framework. 
Note 3. Supporting the time varying results, Kalbaska and Gatkowski (2012) - who analyze 
the EU CDS markets before 2011 - find that Greece, Spain and Italy have a lower power to 
trigger contagion than the core EU countries. 
Note 4. We analyze in this paper the CDS on bonds issued by the following banks: Deutsche 
Bank (DBK) and Ing (ING) for Germany (the latter is Dutch, but no alternative data were 
available), Société Générale (SGA) and Credit Agricole (CAG) for France, Monte dei Paschi 
(MPS) and Intesa SanPaolo (ISP) for Italy and Caixa (CAIXA) and Banco Bilbao Vizcaya 
Argentaria (BBVA) for Spain. The empirical analysis is carried out in terms of rates of 
change of the spreads since CDS, in levels, are nonstationary. The unit root tests – performed 
both with the standard ADF tests and the LM tests with unknown structural breaks of Lee and 
Strazicich (2003, 2004) are available from the authors upon request. 
Note 5. It is well known that, beside a pure credit risk, the CDS premia includes a liquidity 
risk and a systemic/macroeconomic risk (see De Santis and Stein, 2016 page 6). These 
components explain the large simultaneous volatility shifts and the differences among the 
premia of Figure1. 
Note 6. The estimates are not reported here for lack of space and are available from the 
authors upon request. 
Note 7. The full set of mean and variance equations parameters of the GARCH estimates are 
not reported here for the sake of parsimony and are available from the authors upon request 
along with the econometric routines written in RATS. 
Note 8. Each graph contains a scatter plot of the conditional correlations between the CDS 
rates of change and the deviations of the difference between the transition variable (viz. the 
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changes in the Greek German bond yields spread) and the threshold c from zero. We report 
the former on the vertical axis and the latter on the horizontal one. For the sake of clarity, we 
have interpolated the scatter plots using local first order polynomial regressions with 
bandwidth based on the nearest neighbor approach. The local regressions are performed on a 
sub sample selected according to the Cleveland (1993) procedure and involves about 100 
evaluation points. Tricube weights are used in the weighted regressions aimed at minimizing 
the weighted sum of squared residuals. The bandwidth span of each local regression is set to 
0.3. 
Note 9. Beltratti and Stultz (Table 2, 2017), find that core country banks’ net holding of bonds 
issued by Greece accounted for 4.99% of banks’ market capitalization in 2010 (5.88% if 
normalized by banks’ tangible equity). A year later these percentages were respectively 5.89% 
and 2.97%. As for bonds issued by Italy, the percentages were 18.45% and 19.69% in 2010, 
whereas in 2011 the figures rose to 27.15% in terms of market capitalization and fell to 9.19% 
in terms of tangible equity. The figures for Greece are quite small if compared to the severe 
turmoil generated by the so called “Greek crisis”. 
Note 10. The full set of mean and variance equations parameters of the GARCH estimates are 
not reported here for the sake of parsimony and are available from the authors upon request. 
Note 11. The first graph in Figure 3 shows the centered seventy days moving averages of the 
Greek-German and of the Italian-German log-term bond yield differentials. They provide a 
visual chronology of the timing of the respective sovereign bond crises along with their size. 
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